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Attack Hardware Cost
• Used Laptop: $150
• Raspberry Pi 3 B+: $40
• External Wireless Adapter: $25
• Software: Free
Small unmanned aerial systems 
(sUAS), often referred to as ‘drones,’ consist
of aeronautical hardware, CPU, RAM, onboard 
storage, 802.11 Wi-Fi or other radio communication 
links, sensors, camera(s), and a controller used by the 
pilot-in-command.  Some have suggested that a drone is 
essentially a flying computer.  As such, drones are potentially 
susceptible to cyber  attacks.  To test this hypothesis on one 
such drone, a Holy Stone HS100 (See Figure 1) was acquired 
to test against various forms of cyber attack.  We identified 
cyber-related vulnerabilities and exploits for the drone, and 
then performed attacks to identify the feasibility, 
practicality, and significance of the attack, as 
well as their effects on the drone’s ability to 
maintain a safe and functional flight. 
To create accurate research, we aimed at 
simulating these attacks through a set up that would
be likely from a real-world bad actor.  We developed a 
small, inexpensive, and portable attack platform consisting of
the credit card-sized Raspberry Pi Model 3 B+ running Linux, 
which served as a network proxy, combined with (primarily) open 
source vulnerability assessment and attack software. Additional 
hardware included secondary external wireless adapters capable of 
running in monitor and promiscuous modes (either at 2.4 or 5GHz 
frequencies) See Figure 2. A small battery powered proxy allows a 
malicious actor to attack cyber-physical systems covertly by physically 
hiding the attack platform, as well as obfuscating attribution (e.g., MAC 
and IP address). A vulnerability assessment was conducted to identify 
vulnerabilities for the drone.  The Holy Stone uses Wi-Fi for the First 
Person Video (FPV) feed, and RF for the Command & Control link.
The drone also served as a Wi-Fi access point running DHCP.  
The Holy Stone also comes with a dedicated physical 
controller, and uses a smart phone for the
FPV video feed. 
The Holy Stone drone was vulnerable 
to several exploits and attacks:
1) Communication links between the controller and drone 
did not require authentication. Multiple users could connect to 
the drone simultaneously, and using a de-authentication attack, 
allow a threat actor to take control of the drone.
2) Exposed unencrypted telnet and FTP services. (Note: The drone’s         
FTP server could not be connected to.) 
3) No authentication mechanism in place for login via telnet. This allows 
multiple users to connect to the drone without authenticating. 
4) Telnet access dropped the user into an unrestricted superuser account. 
Using the “turnoff” and “reboot” commands dropped the FPV link from 
the drone to the controller, requiring a physical reboot of the drone in 
order to reconnect.  
5) A de-authentication attack was performed on the FPV video link
between the controller and the drone, resulting in a loss of the FPV 
video feed (See Figure 3).
6) No authentication was required to connect from the 
smart phone (used for FPV) and the drone. This 
link was unencrypted, which allowed us to
eavesdrop on the connection.
The purpose of this research was to identify 
vulnerabilities and exploits related to a single hobbyist 
drone. We found that the drone provided remote access without
any mechanism for authentication, and the communication links 
were not encrypted. When connecting over telnet or FTP, users 
were dropped into a superuser account, which has unrestricted access 
to commands, files, and directories. We identified onboard 
destructive commands, including commands to delete files and 
directories, kill processes, and turn the drone off. We performed 
Wi-Fi de-authentication attacks resulting in disconnects between 
the controller and drone. Uploading and downloading files via 
FTP could theoretically be possible on the HS100 should the
FTP server be running. While this drone has multiple 
vulnerabilities, these results are by no means 
generalizable to other drones, and certainly 
not military drones, which are
entirely different animals.  
